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COMPENSATION FOR PAIN: A REAPPRAISAL
IN LIGHT OF NEW. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Cornelius]. Peck*
for pain and suffering have long provided a target for
critics of the present tort law system.1 Courts and commentators
have characterized payments for pain and suffering as uncertain,2
"anomalous" in light of present day theories of loss allocation,3 and
without "consistent significance."4 Longstanding medical theory,
however, supports the hypothesis that the conduct of the tortfeasor is
the primary cause of the pain experienced by the victim.5 Thus, defenders of compensation for pain and suffering can relate their claim
to a general objective of tort jurisprudence: A wrongdoer who causes
harm should provide such compensation to an innocent victim as
will place the latter in the position he would have occupied but for
the ·wrongdoing.
The theory that a primary causal link exists benveen the victim's
pain and the tortfeasor's acts provides considerable appeal for the
proposition that the wrongdoer should compensate for the victim's
pain. However, recent investigations of the phenomenon of pain by
disciplines of the health sciences have challenged the medical theory
upon which recoveries for pain and suffering are based. The results
of that work are of obvious interest to the legal profession, for the
new view of pain suggests that the tortfeasor's acts bear only a
tangential relationship to the pain that some victims experience. The
results thus raise questions of how well the recognition given pain
and suffering under existing law serves the interests of society in
general and of tort law in particular. An improved understanding of
the phenomenon of pain can be put to immediate and practical use
by lawyers and judges working with cases ~at involve damage claims
for pain and suffering.
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• Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S. 1944, LL.B. 1949, Harvard University.-Ed.
I. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 I.Aw 8:
CoNTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUM. L.
REv. 476 (1959); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200 (1958);
Proehl, Anguish of Mind: Damages for Mental Suffering under Illinois Law, 56 Nw.
U. L. REv. 477 (1961).
2. Plant, supra note 1, at 211.
3. Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345,
15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
4. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224.
5. See text accompanying notes 6-7 infra.

[ 1355]

1356

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, '72:11155

I. THE CURRENT MEDICAL VIEWS OF p AIN
Until quite recently medical researchers accepted the view that
pain was caused by stimulation of specialized pain receptors. Advocates of this "specificity theory" suggested that stimulation activating the nerve endings resulted from action that either destroyed or
irritated tissue. The impulse produced by the stimulation in the
peripheral nerve was thought to be transmitted to the spinal column
and relayed to the higher levels of the nervous system, passing
through the brain from the thalamus to the somatosensory cortex.
Stimulation of the receptor, it was thought, always elicited pain and
elicited only the sensation of pain.6 In layman's terms, the process
approximated the receipt of a message sent over a telephone system
designed to transmit messages clearly and distinctly. The system was
not designed to produce messages, and only its malfunction could
cause alterations or modifications of the messages.7
For tort law, the specificity theory implied that, since a painful
experience required physical stimulation of the peripheral nerves,
the tortious contact caused by the ·wrongdoer produced the victim's
discomfort. So long as physical injury was considered a sine qua non
of pain and suffering the party who caused the injury was believed
responsible.
Recent studies, however, have established that a theory of pain
based only on tissue damage or irritation cannot explain all the observations of pain in persons who are neither psychiatrically disturbed nor suffering from mental disorders. 8 These studies indicate
that pain is not one sensation varying only in intensity; it is many
varied sensations.9 As one observer put it, we should perhaps discuss
6. See H. MERSKEY & F. SPEAR, PAIN: PsYCHOLOGICAL AND PsYCHlATRIC As1'£CTS 2'7
(1967); R. STERNBACH, PAIN: A PsYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 39-40 (1968); Casey, The
Neurophysiologic Basis of Pain, 53 PoSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 58; Melzack &: Wall,
Psychophysiology of Pain, 8 INTL. AN£STH. CLINICS 3, 4-6 (1970). Consistent with the
specific receptor theory is the fact that some nerve fibers have a particularly large
diameter and are sheathed with a fatty substance known as myelin; other nerves
have a smaller diameter and lack an insulating cover. The larger myelinated nerve
fibers conduct impulses at a much faster rate than the smaller nerves. Tl1is may
account for the two types of pain many persons report following an injury, the first
being a bright, pricking pain and the second a dull, aching pain. See R. Sn:RNnAcH,
supra, at 30. But see id. at 30-31.
7. Proponents of the specificity theory recognized certain aberrations in their
hypothesis. The phantom pains of an amputee obviously are not caused by nerve
endings in the foot that has been removed. In very rare cases persons with mental
disorders suffer hysterical pain, and other psychiatric disturbances may produce
complaints of pain with no organic basis. These were viewed as exceptional cases,
in which the nervous system was operating improperly.
8. See H. MERSKEY & F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 28-30; R. STERNDACH, supra note 6,
at 9-12; Casey, supra note 6, at 59.
9. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 2; T. SZASZ, PAIN AND PLEASURE Jo.JI, 40
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pain as Eskimos discuss snow, assigning a separate word to each of the
forms in which snow may be found but dispensing with a single
word encompassing all of its forms.10
One of the first departures from the specificity theory postulated
that pain resulted from a pattern of nerve stimuli reported to the
central nervous system. According to this "pattern theory," the
quality of pain is determined by the spatiotemporal configuration of
impulses over nerve routes that serve general sensory functions and
are not specific for pain.11 The pattern theory departs from the telephone message model; it assumes the existence of some central nervous system process that evaluates the pattern of nerve impulses
received from a peripheral source.
A much more radical departure from the specificity theory was
the formulation by Doctors Ronald Melzack and P. D. Wall of a
theory of "gate control" of nerve impulses arriving at the spinal
column.12 Essentially, Melzack and Wall propose that the densely
packed nerve cells in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord-known as
the substantia gelatinosa-mediate, moderate, and filter the incoming
signals from peripheral nerves. These signals consist of impulses
traveling along small diameter unmyelinated (uninsulated) or thinly
myelinated nerves-an essential component of physiological painand faster-traveling impulses conducted along larger diameter
myelinated nerve fibers. The impulses traveling along the larger
diameter fibers normally produce the sensations of touch and pressure, and quickly activate the first central transmission cells (T cells),
which transmit signals to higher levels of the central nervous system.
The pain impulses, traveling along the smaller nerve fibers, at first
have little effect upon the T cells, but their effect is enhanced as that
of the impulses of the larger myelinated nerve fibers diminishes.
How~ver, further stimulation of the larger sensory nerves will
dampen and reduce the effect of the pain impulses received from the
smaller nerve fibers. (It thus may be that a mother in fact reduces the
pain sensation when she kisses and rubs a bumped head or knee.)
The exact process that controls the operation of the "gate," or
the filtering function, remains uncertain, but the filtering appears to
(1957); Sternbach, Strategies and Tactics in the Treatment of Patients with Pain, in
176-77 (B. Crue ed. 1970).

PAIN AND SUFFERING

10. T. SZASZ, supra note 9, at 10.
11. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 40-41; Melzack and Wall, supra note 6,
at 7-10.
12. Melzack &: Wall, Gate Control Theory of Pain, in PAIN 11 (A. Soulairac, J. Cahn
&: J. Charpentier eds. 1968); Melzack &: Wall, supra note 6. See generally Casey, supra
note 6,
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be regulated by some central mechanism from the brain that has been
triggered into action by the patterned impulses transmitted through
the T cells. Thus it appears that a physiological mechanism exists
through which the higher levels of the central nervous system control
the sensory input of pain.13 Melzack and Wall summarize the significance of this system for the psychological control of pain:
[l]t is important to recognize the role of cognitive or "higher central
nervous system" activities such as anxiety, attention, and suggestion
in pain processes. The model suggests that psychological factors such
as past experience, attention, and emotion influence pain response
and perception by acting on the gate control system. The degree of
central control, however, would be determined, in part at least, by
the temporal-spatial properties of the input patterns. Some of the
most unbearable pains, such as cardiac pain, rise so rapidly in intensity that the patient is unable to achieve any control over them. On
the other hand, more, slowly rising temporal patterns are susceptible
to central control and may allow the patient to "think about something else" or use other stratagems to keep the pain under control.14

Other researchers have challenged some aspects of Melzack and
Wall's assertions,15 and the theory will undoubtedly undergo further
development. Gate control assumes additional significance, however,
insofar as it complements and helps to explain physiologically the
contributions made by psychiatrists and psychologists with respect to
the understanding of pain. For example, Melzack and Wall refer to
the pain experiences of men wounded in battle,16 an allusion to Dr.
Henry Beecher's study of soldiers injured in the battle on Anzio
13. Melzack &: Wall, supra note 6, at 22. The researchers describe the physiology
of the phenomenon:
It is now firmly established that stimulation of the brain activates descending
efferent fibers ..• which can influence afferent conduction at the earliest synaptic
levels of the somesthetic system •••• There is evidence • • • to suggest that these
central influences are mediated through the gate control system. While some
central activities, such as anxiety or excitement, may open or close the {fate
for all inputs at any site of the body, others obviously involve selective, localized
gate activity. For example, men wounded in battle may feel little or no pain
from the wound (because it signifies that they survived the battle) but may complain bitterly about an inept vein puncture. • • • The signals, then, must be
identified, evaluated in terms of prior experience, localized, and inhibited before
the action system responsible for pain reception and response is activated. We
propose, therefore, that there exists in the nervous system a mechanism, which
we call the central control trigger, that activates the particular, selective brain
process that exerts control over the sensory input processes.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). See also Melzack &: Chapman, Psychologic Aspects
of Pain, 53 PosrcRAD. MED., May 1973, at 69, 69-70.
15. See Christensen & Perl, Spinal Neurons Specifically Exdted by Noxious or
Thermal Stimuli: Marginal Zone of the Dorsal Horn, 33 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 293
(1970); Mosso &: Kruger, Spinal Trigeminal Neurons Excited by Noxious and Thermal
Stimuli, 38 BRAIN RESEARCH 206 (1972).
16. See note 13 supra.
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beachhead during World War II.17 The men studied had been under
shell fire for several weeks when they received wounds that were
serious enough to require their hospitalization and eventual evacuation. When questioned seven to twelve hours after being wounded,
only a little more than one quarter of the men said that they had
enough pain to require treatment, such as administration of a pain
killer.18 In a comparison group of civilians who had undergone
planned surgery in a hospital, 87 per cent said within an average of
2.9 hours after their operation that they wanted treatment for their
pain.19 Dr. Beecher believed that the battle wounds, consisting of
flesh torn and bones broken by flying shrapnel, provided a greater
physiological basis for pain than did the carefully executed incisions
of surgeons.20 He therefore attributed the difference in the pain responses of the two gi:oups to something other than the degree of
physical destruction caused by the wound. For the men at Anzio,
wounds provided an escape from a situation involving great anxiety
and fear of death.21 The neat, surgical incisions of the civilians, on
the other hand, signified tragedy. The soldiers' wounds resulted in a
lessening of anxiety about their futures; anxieties of the surgical
patients may have been intensified. Dr. Beecher's data thus support
the widely held hypothesis that anxiety increases the intensity of
pain.22
Anxiety is a conditioned (anticipatory) fear response, and the
extent to which one suffers pain can therefore be expected to vary
with the ease with which he is conditioned to expect unpleasantness.
Individuals with a personality type characterized as extrovert are
not as easily conditioned and bring less of this pain component to a
situation than introverts, who are more easily conditioned.23
Natural childbirth as now practiced in the United States furnishes
an excellent example of how anxiety affects the amount of pain
experienced. The exercises performed and the classes attended by an
17. Beecher, Relationship of Significance of Wound to Pain Experienced, 161
J.A.M.A. 1609 (1956).
18. Id. at 1610.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1612.
22. See J. BoNICA, THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 156 (1953); R. STERNBACH, supra
note 1, at 69-70; Clark 8: Mehl, Thermal Pain: A Sensory Decision Theory Analysis,
78 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 202, 208 (1971); Melzack 8: Chapman, supra note 14,
at 70-71; Smith, Some Medicolegal Aspects of Pain, Suffering and Mental Anguish in
American Law and Culture, in PAIN AND SUFFERING, supra note 9, at 186, 195-96.
23. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 67-72. See also H. MERSKEY 8: F. SPEAR, supra
note 6, at 161-62.
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expectant mother in preparation for a natural childbirth undoubtedly increase that woman's physical capabilities, but they also
develop an attitude of confidence, understanding, and freedom from
fear. Such an attitude permits some women to endure childbirth
sensations that others find so intolerable as to require anesthesia. 24
The behavior of recipients in organ transplant operations furnishes another striking illustration. To ensure the acceptance of the
transplanted organ the recipient is frequently not given analgesic
medication. He is, however, psychologically prepared for the transplant and strongly desires it; consequently he often reports no pain.
Donors likewise are frequently free of pain.26
II.

THE

"SOCIAL" CONTENT OF PAIN

It is thus apparent that pain can no longer be considered simply
a physiological phenomenon. It has a social and interpersonal aspect
from birth. The pain that produces the baby's cry in tum elicits comforting and loving support from parents or protectors. Similarly, in
early childhood pain is commonly associated with discipline and
hence with parental or social disapproval. At this time the superego
of the personality structure is developing, so that from the beginning
pain is firmly connected with guilt. A child learns not only that his
behavior can be influenced by pain inflicted upon him, but that he
may influence the behavior of others by inflicting pain on them. Pain
thus achieves recognition as an effective control of conduct, useful
even for the control of one's own aggressions.26
Pain continues to have an interpersonal communicative role
when an individual emerges from childhood. Manifestations of pain
remain effective to communicate appeals for attention, love, and sup24. J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 151; G. DICK-READ, CmLDBIRTII WITIIOUT FEAR
46-48 (1959); R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 25. Cultural differences in the attitudes
of women toward childbirth undoubtedly affect their anxieties. In some societies
women are able to give birth naturally without crying out or writhing. See J. EMDREE,
SUYE MURA, A JAPANESE VILLAGE 178-79 (1939); M. MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA 20
(1961). See also G. DICK-READ, supra, at 2.
25. Letter from Dr. Richard G. Black, Coordinator of the Pain Clinic of the
University of Washington, to the author, January 7, 1974, on file with the Michigan
Law Review. Dr. Black's impression is that the donors he did treat for pain were
those whose donated organ was biologically rejected by the recipient. Id.
26. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 87; Engel, "Psychogenic" Pain and the
Pain-Prone Patient, 26 AM. J. MED. 899, 901 (1959). Indeed, the phenomenon of pain
is so affected by the interpersonal relationships of childhood that it has been
reported that individuals raised in large families manifest more pain behavior than
those raised in small families. Gonda, The Relation Between Complaints of Persistent
Pain and Family Size, 25 J. NEUROL, NEUROSURG, PSYCHIATRY 277, 277-81 (1962). See
also H. MERSKEY Se F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 176. Problems of communication arise
in large families, and the manifestation of pain may be a more effective communication than a well-stated request.
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port among adults, and they are so used.27 It is not only a Pavlov's
dog or a grain-seeking pigeon that can be conditioned to perform in a
certain manner because that performance usually earns a reward or
avoids an undesirable consequence; the connection between the desired goal and a pattern of behavior may also be perceived and acted
upon by humans at levels below rational articulation.28
Social factors may even produce pain that lacks an adequate
organic or physiological basis. In the literature of pain, this phenomenon has been designated "psychogenic" pain.29 Psychogenic pain
may validate communications requesting help or establishing an
excuse. For example, the aging laborer learns that manifestation of
pain will obtain for him a period of rest. Perhaps he has gradually
found the work not only physically exhausting but socially embarrassing, because it demonstrates his declining physical condition and
the superiority of the young men with whom he works. Pain may
provide an excuse for staying away from work and avoiding not only
physical burden but social embarrassment. Or a younger workman,
threatened by the removal of a supportive supervisor or the arrival
of a workman whose performance is at a higher level, may feel enough
pain to justify absenting himself from the potential challenges and
embarrassment of work. Similarly, the housewife who experiences
and manifests pain may thus avoid the housework she despises. A person who does not desire sexual relations may, upon experiencing
pain, learn that it provides an excuse for not satisfying the partner's
demands.30
27. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 87-90. Cf. Szasz, The Psychology of Persistent
Pain, in PAIN, supra note 12, at 93, 93-95.
28. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, about students of B.F. Skinner who
decided to bring to an end the peripatetic lecture style of one of their professors.
They agreed upon a "reward corner" in the lecture room, and manifested great
interest in the portions of a lecture delivered from that place-an interest that
diminished in proportion to the distance by which the professor removed himself from
that corner. As the story goes, the students had the professor pinned in the corner
within two weeks, though he did not know why he had altered his lecture style.
29. See Engel, supra note 26.
30. Of course, it is not only tensions of work or family life that may provide the
incentive for utilizing pain to achieve desired adjustments. Indeed, it may be the
absence of interest or activity that provides the situation in which pain is rewarding.
Thus, a woman whose children have grown and left the house or whose husband
has become inattentive may learn that manifestation of pain produces interest and
concern. If her pain is great enough she will break the monotony of home life by
consulting a doctor. If her pain does not respond to treatment she may become a
subject of special interest and attract the attention of several medical experts. If she
experienced her first pain in an accident her pain may in addition bring the attention
and concern of her lawyer. Similarly, the individual whose career has reached its
culmination may find that it is no longer interesting, and may seek another career
in a life of pain. The noted psychiatrist Thomas Szasz has described such persons as
having adopted a career of suffering. Szasz, supra note 27, at 97-99. Others agree that
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In psychological terms, these individuals have been subjected to
operant conditioning. "Operant" pain is learned pain, produced by
systematic and repeated environmental consequences following pain
manifestation.31 Psychologists might assert that those who experience
operant pain have learned to do so as a defense to or escape from an
aversive situation. Additionally, expressions of concern and solicitude
from others may reinforce the manifestations of pain. The pain that
has thus been learned may be repeated and rewarded even though its
pathologic or organic stimulus lessens or disappears. It becomes
chronic, and the patient does not respond to normal treatment.32
The experience of psychogenic pain does not, however, imply
serious mental disorder. On the contrary, as explained by Professor
Wilbert E. Fordyce:
It is quite unnecessary to postulate some form of personality problem
or emotional disturbance. It is equally true that, once burdened with
some seemingly noxious or uncomfortable behavioral habit such as
pain (smoking, persistent overeating, excessive drinking are equally
illustrative), only very rarely does one change that behavior by deciding to do so. Habits are acquired by one's having undergone
repeated learning experiences. Habits are changed by undergoing
systematic re-learning or de-conditioning.33

The experience of psychogenic pain, therefore, may indicate nothing
more than the fulfillment of some need that has previously been satisfied by "real" (physiologically based) pain. A person ridden with
guilt may find in pain a rewarding punishment for the guilty conduct
that obsesses him. 34 Guilt-ridden patients may even reject painless
there are many such persons. Hirschfeld &: Behan, The Accident Process (pt. I), 186
J.A.M.A 193 (1963); Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 72; Sternbach, Murphy,
Akeson &: Wolf, Chronic Low-Back Pain-The "Low-Back Loser," 53 PosrGRAD, MED,,
May 1973, at 135; 137.
31. See Fordyce, An Operant Conditioning Method for Managing Chronic Pain,
53 PosrcRAD. MED., May 1973, at 123, 123-28. "Psychogenic pain" is the terminology
of psychiatrists; the term "operant pain" is used by psychologists. Dr. George Engel
explains in his leading article that the term "psychogenic pain" has in recent years
been applied by exclusion to those instances in which no physiological cause of pain
can be demonstrated, making it an appropriate term for all types of pain that serve
as psychic regulators. Engel, supra note 26, at 916.
32. Brodsky, Social Psychiatric Consequences of Job Incompetence, 12 COllll'RE•
HENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 526 (1971); Fordyce, supra note 31, at 123-25. A case history
illustrative of some aspects of this process may be found in A. 'WATSON, PSYCHIATRY
FOR LAWYERS 284-87 (1968).
33. Letter from Wilbert E. Fordyce, Professor of Rehabilitation Medicine, School
of Medicine, University of Washington, to the author, December 28, 1973, on file
with the Michigan Law Review.
34. H. MERSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 86, 172; R. STERNBACH, sttpra note 6,
at 72, 145-46; Engel, supra note 26, at 905; Ripley, The Psychologic Basis of Pain, in
J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 143, 148.
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treatment and instead accept painful procedures.35 An individual may
also use pain to control aggressiveness or sexual desires that he believes to be ,vrongful or forbidden.36 Some persons apparently substitute p~in for a loved one who has died.37 Amputees who have
chronically painful phantom limbs probably "need" the pain for
psychological reasons: It may be an expression of anger turned
toward themselves, a denial of the loss of the limb, or a means of
justifying unacceptable dependency needs.38 Finally, pain is useful to
persons who are lonely. Most conversations require that the participants know something about the subject and be interested in it,
whether it be sports, current events, literature, or something else.
Pain, however, is a subject that everyone understands and about
which a speaker is an expert if the pain described is his own. It is,
moreover, a subject that may be raised formally as an appropriate
response to casual greetings, even from relative strangers.
So well does pain serve the needs of some of its sufferers that they
resist efforts to bring about a cure. Thus, it has been suggested that
some injured workmen fight to preserve their incapacity, hiding
symptoms from their doctor for fear that he will diagnose and treat
them. Such patients may avoid doctors who seem likely to cure them
and seek out doctors who pose no such threat.39 The anesthesiologist
who succeeds in using an analgesic to block pain may encounter
violent hostility from the patient whose pain he has taken away.40
Furthermore, patients with chronic pain are among the most reluctant to accept a psychiatric referral or to participate in psychotherapy.41
35. Engel, supra note 26, at 905.
36. Id. at 909.
37. Id. at 901, 908.
38. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 131-32.
39. Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra note 30, at 196-98.
40. Such a case was described by Dr. Richard G. Black, Coordinator of the Pain
Clinic of the University of Washington Medical School to Dr. Herbert Ripley, a
psychiatrist associated with the Clinic, at one of the sessions of the Clinic attended
by the author. A suggestion made by Dr. Ripley was that the patient was a man
"who needs his pain."
41. Engel, supra note 26, at 917; Fellner, Post-Traumatic Neurosis-Theme and
Variations, 37 INDUS. MED. &: SURGERY 347, 348 (1968).
Persons suffering from chronic pain are frequently depressed, a condition caused
for some by the self-analysis induced by a serious injury or illness. Miller &: Fellner,
Compensable Injuries and Accompanying Neurosis: The Problem of Continuing Incapacity Despite Medical Recovery, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 184, 189. But it is erroneous to
assume that all depressed persons suffering from chronic pain are depressed because
of their pain; instead, their pain may be a manifestation of their depression. Engel,
supra, at 915; Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra note 30, at 195-96; Melzack and Chapman,
supra note 14, at 71; Sternbach, Murphy, Akeson &: Wolf, supra note 30, at 136.
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The principle of cognitive dissonance42 helps explain why some
individuals adopt a life of pain. According to this principle, persons
tend to maintain consistent views, or cognitions, about themselves
and the world. The presence of dissonance-inconsistency-gives
rise to pressures to restore cognitive equilibrium. A person experiences dissonance if his view of himself conflicts with the image he
wishes to present to others. The desire to present the image of one in
pain, which may arise for many reasons, including those discussed
above, may thus prompt a person subconsciously to nurture weak impulses from peripheral nerves into disabling or intolerable pain.43
It should be added that recent studies establish that pain thresholds and pain tolerance vary among cultures, races, age groups, and
sexes. Social forces are a very likely cause of the variations. Generally
speaking, men exhibit a greater tolerance for pain than women. 44
Younger persons have a greater tolerance for pain than older persons.45 Tolerance of pain also has an identifiable relationship with
race and nationality. For example, Jews and Italians are not as inhibited about displays of suffering as the "older American" types,46
and, contrary to the stereotype of the inscrutable Oriental, one study
indicates that Orientals have less tolerance for pain than whites, with
blacks occupying a middle ground.47 Schizophrenics, perhaps because
of a divorce of ego from body, have a much greater tolerance for pain
than normal individuals.48 Even among individuals with no markedly
distinguishing characteristics reaction to pain stimuli may vary
greatly.49 Indeed, it has even been suggested that reaction to pain may
Some individuals build to a crisis state, which demands the occurrence of an event
~~~~~~~~b~~~~~~~~~

note 32, passim; Engel, supra, at 908; Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra, at 193-94.

42. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNlTIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
43. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 64.

44. Blitz &: Dinnerstein, Role of Attentional Focus in Pain Perception: Manipulatio11

of Response ta Noxious Stimulation by Instructions, 77 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 42
(1971); Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &: Collen, Pain Tolerance: Differences According to Age, Sex, and Race, 34 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 548 (1972). But see Clark &: Mehl,
supra note 22, at 202 (older women had a higher pain threshold than men or young
women).
45. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 72-73; Woodrow, Friedman, Sicgelaub &:
supra note 44. But see Clark &: Mehl, supra note 22, at 208.
46. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 74; Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &:
supra note 44. Cf. Ripley, supra note 34, at 148.
47. Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &: Collen, supra note 44.
48. H. MlmsKEY &: F. Sl>EAR, supra note 6, at 103.
49. V. CAssINARI &: C. PAGNI, CENTRAL PAIN 3-4 (1969); Engel, supra note 26,
Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 70; Ripley, supra note 34, at 143-44;
supra note 22, at 190.

Collen,
Collen,

at 902:
Smith,

June 1974]

Compensation for Pain

1365

vary with birth order in the family, depending upon the family's
socioeconomic group.50
In short, recent observations establish that pain is a social and
psychological as well as physiological phenomenon. In the past there
has been too much reliance solely upon surgical and other physiological attempts to cure chronic pain. Because of the various bases of
pain, it can best be treated by a multidisciplinary approach. New
procedures may provide a cure for psychogenic pain that cannot be
eliminated by traditional methods.51
One must not conclude, however, that psychogenic pain does not
involve the sensations associated with physiologically caused pain.
Psychogenic pain produces actual discomfort and thus is not imaginary or unreal. 52 A person who suffers psychogenic pain should be
distinguished from a malingerer; a malingerer does not suffer pain,
but consciously engages in behavior designed to deceive observers
into believing that he does. Indeed, psychogenic pain may, like other
50. H. 1-fuRSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 73.
51. A recently developed procedure for the treatment of chronic pain, and one
probably better designed for relief of psychogenic pain than others, is operant conditioning. See R. BERNI &:
FORDYCE, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION AND THE NURSING
PROCESS (in press); E. REEsE, THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN OPERANT BEHAVIOR 49-63 (1966);
Fordyce, supra note 31; Fordyce, Fowler, Lehmann &: DeLateur, Some Implications of
Leaming in Problems of Chronic Pain, 21 J. CHRONIC DISEASE 179 (1968). Operant
conditioning for the management of chronic pain involves "(1) identification and
elimination of positive reinforcers to the pain behavior, (2) increase in physical
activity, and (3) gradual decrease in and eventual elimination of intake of analgesics
and other drugs." Fordyce, supra, at 125. The rewards for pain are diminished or
eliminated; rewards for healthy or normal activity are substituted. Pain-related
behavior is then abandoned in favor of behavior that is reinforced.
In recognition of the interpersonal aspects of pain, members of the family may
be involved in the treatment. This is consistent with the view that pain is frequently
the family's pain rather than the sole property of the patient. Family members are
instructed not to give positive reinforcement to pain behavior by elaborate demonstrations of concern, but instead to reinforce activities and behaviors that are consistent with a return to a healthy absence of pain. In some cases, family members
may reassess the_ir relationship with the patient and identify the reasons that led them
to reinforce pain behavior. Bonica, Fundamental Considerations of Chronic Pain
Therapy, 53 PosrGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 83, 85; Fordyce, supra note 31, at 128;
Fordyce, Fowler, Lehmann &: DeLateur, supra, at 180-83. See also AbrolllS, Fellner &:
Whitaker, The Family Enters the Hospital, 127 AM.. J. PSYCHIATRY 1363 (1971)
(psychiatric patients).
Other methods for treating chronic pain are also being developed, utilizing what
has been learned about attention, anxiety, depression, and conditioning. Melzack &:
Chapman, supra note 14. Experiences of soldiers in combat and athletes in contact
games combine with the gate theory of pain to suggest that attentional processes can
be used to control pain. For example, a method known as Alpha feedback training
combines the use of distraction of attention from a painful body site, strong or
hypnotic suggestions, and relaxation of anxieties. The technique develops a sense of
control over pain and reduces both anxiety and pain. Melzack &: Chapman, supra,
at 73-75.
52, J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 134-37; H. 1-fuRSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6,
at 25, 85-86; Fordyce, supra note 31, at 123-24; Szasz, supra note 27, at 99-100.
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pain, eventually produce physical deterioration of the sufferer's body.
Psychophysiologic processes such as restriction of nasal passages or
elevation of blood pressure may over time become biologically destructive,53 and muscle tension alone may produce a substance that is
toxic to living cells. 54 Among the most perverse risks of physical harm
from psychogenic pain are unnecessary surgery and drug addiction. 0°
The simple acknowledgment that psychogenic pain exists does not
in itself justify an exploration of its legal significance. Problems of
proof abound in determining the source of pain, and determination
of whether pain is psychological or physiological is not a simple
matter. For instance, one study reveals that twenty-five to thirty-five
per cent of patients with pain from surgical operations or other
organic sources receive the same relief from a placebo as from a
narcotic. 56 If psychogenic pain patients are only a nominal portion of
all persons with chronic pain, the need for certainty might make it
preferable to apply one rule to all cases.
Despite its importance, the amount of research on chronic pain
has been relatively small, and there are still large gaps in our knowledge about it. 57 It appears, however, that chronic pain has three main
causes: (1) persistent, peripheral noxious stimulation; (2) disease of
the cerebral-spinal axis; and (3) operant mechanisms. 08 The first
category includes arthritis, herniated disks, ulcers, cancer, and
coronary artery disease-the resultant pains have substantial organic
or physiological bases. The second category consists of diseases or
disorders of cranial or spinal nerves, sometimes referred to as various
forms of neuralgia. 59 Third category pain may be initiated by noxious
stimulation, but it is so reinforced through operant conditioning6°
that it becomes independent of its organic or physiological base. Doctor John Bonica, a leading investigator of the phenomenon of pain,
53.
54.

J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 149-50.
J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 151; Rodbard, Muscle Pain, in PAIN AND SUFFERING,

supra note 9, at 154.
55. Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 72.
56. Bonica, supra note 51, at 83-84.
The psychological aspects of pain are not limited to the patient. The physician
who feels a professional obligation to cure may react to a patient's persistent failure
to respond to treatment with hostility, making impossible the rapport that might
bring about a success. Behan &: Hirschfield, The Accident Process (pt. 2), 186 J.A.M.A.
300, 301-03 (1963). On the other hand, the physician may attempt to save face by
adopting his patient'(! view that the pain is severe and incurable.
57. Bonica, Introduction to Symposium on Management of Pain, 53 POSTGRAD, l\:IED,,
May 1973, at 56, 57.
58. Bonica, supra note 51, at 82.
59. See Loeser, Neuralgia, 53 POSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 207.
60. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.

June 1974]

Compensation for Pain

1367

states that operant mechanisms are "among the most common causes
of chronic pain and prolonged disability." 61 Hubert Winston Smith,
a lawyer and doctor, states that most neurologists agree that very few
traumatic injuries produce permanent pain.62 The noted psychiatrist
Thomas Szasz ·writes that one thing that strikes the careful observer
of patients with chronic pain is that such patients have made a career
of suffering.63 Another psychiatrist, George Engel, suggests that
symptoms that deviate from anatomical and physiological principles
governing pathological pain should immediately caution the physician that peripheral nerve impulses play no role or that their influence is being obscured by other factors. 64
The current medical views of pain-in particular the gate control theory-thus pose obvious and direct challenges to the physiological basis of pain that tort law seems to assume. The degree, duration, and even the existence of a claimant's pain may be determined
by matters other than noxious stimulation of peripheral nerves. The
relationship bea\Teen injury and pain therefore may be entirely different from the assumed relationship that underlies the conclusion
that a tortfeasor should compensate a claimant for pain experienced
61. Bonica, supra note 51, at 82.
62. Smith, supra note 22, at 191; Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury
Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 586, 610 (1953).
63. Szasz, supra note 27, at 97.
64. Engel, supra note 26, at 903. Two other doctors, who conducted a study of
approximately 300 cases of industrial accidents and injuries, give similar advice,
stating that except when clearly explained by normal responses to anatomical defects,
chronicity in injury cases should be considered psychogenic unless proved othenvise.
Behan &: Hirschfield, supra note 56, at 303. In another study of 200 patients receiving
or seeking compensation as a result of work-incurred disability, it was noted that
the patients had common personality characteristics that resulted in a state of crisis
of tension on the job preceding the incapacitating event. Brodsky, supra note 32,
at 528-29. The patients' view of how severely they had been injured frequently was
distorted by their inability to remember realistically what their life situation had
been before the injury; they substituted the situation remembered from the prime
of their lives. See Fellner, supra note 41, at 348; Miller &: Fellner, supra note 41,
at 186. Another psychiatrist who has served as a consultant in cases of prolonged
incapacitation from industrial injuries notes that medically the most characteristic
aspect of the referred patients' symptomatology is the gross discrepancy between the
organic impairment and the disability exhibited. Fellner, supra, at 348. Dr. Richard
Sternbach, another authority on pain, has noted that there is no dependable relationship between pathological injury and the degree of pain experienced. R. STERNBACH,
supra note 6, at 27. He and others have identified a type of chronic low back pain
sufferer, whom they have characterized as the "low back loser," for whose pain the
causes do not appear to be primarily organic. Sternbach, Murphy, Akeson &: Wolf,
supra note 30. The same appears to be true for man's most common complaint,
the headache. Friedman, Headache, 53 PoSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 172, 178. Indeed,
Dr. Seymour Diamond, a headache expert at the University of Chicago, estimates
that nine out of ten headaches are due to emotions and other psychological factors;
only ten per cent have an underlying organic cause. Kotulak, Pain Learned?, Detroit
Free Press, July 22, 1974, § C, at 1, cols. 1-3.
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after injury. The desirability of requiring compensation for pain thus
deserves re-examination.
III.

THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CURRENT MEDICAL

Vmws

The significance of the current medical views of pain for the law
governing compensation of accident victims depends upon the purposes that that law seeks to serve and how well present rules governing compensation fulfill those purposes. The principal objective of
tort law has been considered to be providing such compensation to
an innocent victim of an injury wrongfully caused by another as
will return the victim to the position in which he would have been
but for the wrongdoing. Other objectives include those of punishing
the wrongdoer, eliminating the need for retaliation or violent selfhelp, and deterring ·wrongful conduct. 65
Recently, however, commentators have perceived these traditional
objectives as subordinate to an overriding social goal of properly allocating risks and resources. I£ the law allows recovery in a given
case, it transfers the cost of the injury from the victim to others; if
the law does not allow recovery, it allocates the cost to the victim.
Recognition of this loss allocation function has produced a body of
literature in which principles of tort law have been subjected to
economic analysis in an attempt to improve their social efficacy. 00
Some commentators have concluded that pain and suffering
awards do not serve any of the objectives of tort law to a degree that
justifies the current generous levels of compensation. Thus, Professor
Plant's excellent survey of damages for pain and suffering awarded
in personal injury cases led him to conclude that juries often awarded
disproportionately large amounts and that such awards were difficult
for courts to control because of the absence of definitive principles.67
He suggested that an upper limit for pain and suffering recoveries
be established at fifty per cent of the victim's medical, nursing, and
hospital expenses.68 Impressed by similar proposals for reformulation
65. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
66. See, e.g., G. CAI.ABRESI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Brown, Toward an
Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 323 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. I.Aw & EcoN. I (1960); Lave, Safety in Transportation:
The Role of the Government, 33 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 512 (1968); Regan, The
Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. I.Aw & EcoN. 427 (1972); Vickery, Automobile
Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 429
(1968). The purposes of the law allocating costs of accidents might be to provide an
accurate accounting, to fix the prices of various types of activities, or to ensure
valid wide-scale economic decisions. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra.
67. Plant, supra note 1, at 210.
68. Id. at 211.
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of the law of damages advanced by Dean Leon Green69 and Professor
Fleming James,70 Professor Clarence Morris concurred in the suggestion that a change be made, with the addenda that recoveries
should be allowed when pain has disabling economic consequences
and that the change be made by the legislature.71 His review of cases
led him to conclude that it was erroneous to view the law as providing pocket money to buy distractions from pain, appealing as that
view might be.1 2
Despite their cogency, the arguments of the commentators have
not resulted in a general reduction or elimination of recoveries for
pain. The new medical evidence provides an additional argument for
limiting or excluding such awards, at least in cases in which no
physiological basis for pain exists. The current understanding of pain
reinforces legislative decisions to omit compensation for pain from
statutory accident reparation plans. The new understanding of pain
may also persuade judges to limit recoveries for pain, perhaps by distinguishing psychogenic pain from other items more properly compensated.

A.

The Role of Pain and Suffering Damages
in the Tort Law System

The propriety of awarding damages specifically for pain and
suffering under the tort law system did not receive close attention
until the middle of the nineteenth century.73 By that time the law
had come to rely heavily upon the principle of negligence for allocating responsibility for accidental injuries, and damages for pain
and suffering had been allowed in enough cases to give the matter
the appearance of being well-settled. The concept of requiring a
·wrongdoer to compensate for pain and suffering an innocent party
whom he has injured had a recognizable appeal in the earlier
trespass action, in which no distinction was made between intended
and unintended consequences.74 The propriety of awarding such
69, L. GREEN, TRAFFIC V1cnMS-TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 88 (1958).
'70. James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293,
297 (1958).
'71. Morris, supra note 1, at 476.
'72. Id. at 479.
73. O'Connell & 13ailey, The History of Payment for Pain and Suffering, in J.
O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN & SUFFERING 83, 94-100 (1972).
74. See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. R.Ev. 359,
362-65 (1951); Malone, Rumination on the Role of Fault in the History of Torts,
in U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
AcnoN 1, 1-33 (1970); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law,
46 WASH, L. REv. 225 (1971).
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damages for unintended harm under the negligence standard thus
never received the consideration it deserved. The lack of a wellestablished liability insurance industry at that time at least ensured
that it was the negligent party who actually paid the damages for
pain and suffering. The rule excluding evidence in the trial of a
tort action as to whether a defendant is insured has preserved the
appearance that it is the defendant who pays. In fact, however, today
the defendant seldom pays pain and suffering damages personally,
because the uninsured defendant is not likely to be sued.70 It is other
people who provide through liability insurance premiums the funds
from which the pain and suffering damages are paid. The concept of
a wrongdoer making amends to the injured party for the unpleasant
experience to which he was subjected no longer justifies the payment
of damages for pain and suffering.
The best explanation of what society now does in awarding
damages for pain and suffering appears to be that advanced by Professor Jaffe: Society is showing its concern for one =who has suffered
an affront to his personality and bodily integrity by offering "a consolation, a solatium." 76 Perhaps the consolation or solatium flows as
much to society as it does to the accident victim. Members of society
may rest easier when they contemplate the possibility that they
might suffer a similar fate, and they need no longer be concerned
with the victim's unfortunate condition because "justice" has been
done.
One may question, however, whether a consolation should be
awarded to one whose pain is psychogenic or preserved by operant
mechanisms. Even if there were a general social fund dedicated to
alleviating the unsought sorrows and tribulations of life generally,
the legitimacy of compensating such pain would be problematical. •
But the source of the victim's compensation in tort litigation is not a
fund created to assist persons in making social adjustments at home
or at work. Moreover, it is possible that the offering of such consolations may, by providing incentives and reinforcement for pain
behavior, serve to increase the pain experienced by those who are to
be consoled. Other members of society have no need for either the
assurance that they will be treated similarly or a release from concern for the person suffering psychogenic pain.
75. The Michigan Automobile Accident Survey indicated that only 1.2% of tort
liability payments come from uninsured sources. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATI',
C. VoTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT Cosrs AND PAYMENTS 48, 50 n.54
(1964) [hereinafter ACCIDENT Cosrs].
76. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 222-25.
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In any event, awards for pain are currently made under the tort
system in circumstances in which the victim cannot receive or appreciate the consolation. Thus awards have been made for pain suffered by persons who died very soon after being injured,77 and to an
infant who recovered completely during the first year of life from a
serious infection caused soon after birth.78 The assumption in
modem American society sometimes seems to be that everything has a
money equivalent, but a short period of reflection leads all but the
most jaded to a contrary conclusion. If we are to use money as a
consolation we should be sure that we have given the consolation because the circumstances are appropriate, and not because everything
has a money equivalent.18
As Jaffe noted,so the argument that a consolation be awarded a
victim is most valid in cases of disfigurement or loss of a member.
That aspect of the tort compensation scheme will not be significantly
affected by the new medical views because most of that compensation
is now given under the heading of mental suffering rather than
pain.81 Some of the pain associated with disfigurement or loss of a
?7. E.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain &: S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
?8. Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P .2d 880, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (1970).
?9. Some insight into the use of money as a consolation in our culture may be
obtained from observation of a primitive culture that uses no money or significant
form of wealth. The stone age natives of the New Guinea highlands pursue what to
us is a gruesome and senseless ceremony if a warrior is killed in battle. Fingers are
cut from the hands of little girls and cremated and buried with the body of the
warrior. See R. GARDNER &: K. HEIDER, GARDENS OF WAR 95-96 (1969). Among the motivations for such conduct must be the attempt to give group recognition to the seriousness
of the death. My anthropologist friends inform me that in pursuing this practice a
concern is shown for its effect on the primitive economy, so that it is the less useful
ring fingers and little fingers that are severed. Would a native of New Guineaassuming he could be informed about our practices of giving money for pain-be
better able to understand our practice than we do theirs?
80. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224.
81. The law has generally made no clear distinction between pain and suffering.
2 F. HARPER&: F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1322 (1956); C. McCoru.ncK, DAMAGES 315
(1935). It has been recognized, however, that for legal purposes the term "pain" is
more appropriately used in connection with the physical or physiological phenomenon,
whereas "suffering" is more appropriately used in connection with the mental or
emotional response to injuries and their probable significance for the future enjoyment of life. C. McCORMICK, supra, at 315; 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 105 (1965);
4 REsrATEllIBNT OF TORTS § 905 (1939). "Suffering" thus includes a wide variety of
reactions to physical injury, such as fear, worry, and anxiety about future health,
embarrassment and humiliation about disfignrement or disabilities, depression, and
resultant functional mental disturbance. In assessing the damages to be awarded for
suffering consideration may be given to the inability to engage in sports or other
recreational or family activities, the inability to perform customary household chores,
and in general the inability to pursue the normal activities of life. Downie v. United
States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966); Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289
F.2d ?97 (2d Cir. 1961); Hanson v. Reiss S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 545 (D. Del. 1960);
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member may be psychogenic, but if the burden of proof lies with the
defendant it is unlikely that juries will decide any but the clearest
cases against the victim.
Another suggested function of the present law of damages is compensation for pain as a noneconomic loss. This theory is of dubious
value even without consideration of the new medical evidence. It
assumes that the degree of pain that the victim suffers determines
the amount of money that he receives. In practice, however, while
any payment to the plaintiff will provide some consolation for his
noneconomic injury, the amount recovered depends upon a variety
of factors other than the degree of harm done. 82
The concept that awarding damages deters the victim or others
acting for him from taking retaliatory action may be served by the
award of damages in cases of intentional wrongdoing, but it does not
provide a compelling rationale for awarding damages for pain suffered because of unintentional injuries. A lawsuit claiming damages
for pain may reflect hostility, but it is more likely pursued for
financial gain. This common sense judgment is fortified by a study
indicating that at the time of injury most automobile accident
victims do not expect that they will be compensated for their pain. 83
The same study also revealed remarkably little resentment on the
part of traffic victims toward other parties involved in the accident,
and the possibility of recovery for pain and suffering produced very
Vastano v. Partownership Brovigtank, 158 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). See also
Dugas v. Kansas City S. Ry. Lines, 473 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1973). Substantial damages
for suffering may thus be obtained even though physical pain has ceased or is
minimal. Miller v. Thomas, 234 S.2d 67 (La. Ct. App. 1970), modified, 258 La, 285,
246 S.2d 16 (1971); Guillory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 96 S.2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 1957);
Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 S.2d 541 (1951). Moreover, damages for mental
suffering may be recovered even though the plaintiff's preexisting mental condition
made him particularly susceptible to an adverse psychological reaction to physical
injury. Leatherman v. Gateway Transp. Co., 331 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964); Feeley v.
United States, 220 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
The mental aspect of suffering is illustrated by one court's holding that damages
for suffering may be reduced in light of the plaintiff's lack of comprehension or
the ability to be rationally cognizant of his suffering. Helms v. United States, 231
F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
Although pain can be distingnished from suffering, a strong relationship between
the tlvo may exist in some cases. Thus, as mentioned above, see text accompanying
notes 37-38 supra, the persistent phantom pains experienced by amputees arc probably
psychogenic and may be related to embarrassment or gnilt over unacceptable dcpen•
dcncy needs. Likewise, the suffering that one experiences because of physical dis•
abilities or disfiguring scars may well be affected by the reactions of family, friends,
or work companions, in a manner comparable to the way in which such reactions
establish operant pain mechanisms.
82. See ACCIDENT Cosrs, supra note 75, at 209-21; Adams, Economic-Financial Con•
sequences of Personal Injuries, 7 EcoN. &: Bus. BULL. 5, 73 (1955).
83. See note 111 infra.
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little change in attitude.84 Society has even less reason to deter
retaliation by sufferers of psychogenic pain. If the victim "needs"
his pain to achieve desired social adjustments he is not likely to attack
the person who gave him what he wanted.
The concept that liability for damages deters parties from dangerous and harmful conduct is of limited applicability to cases involving unintended consequences. The random and questionable
effect on the conduct of tortfeasors of liability for pain and suffering
is apparent without consideration of the new medical views of pain.
Those views give added emphasis to the unpredictability of the
amount of damages that may be awarded if conduct results in painful injury, thus eliminating such awards from consideration as controlled regulators of conduct.
A final and desperate rationalization for pain and suffering
damages is that they compensate the victim for economic losses that
are not othenvise fully met. Some have noted that remuneration for
a plaintiff's out-of-pocket losses do not fully return him to the position he would have occupied but for the tort because his award
makes no provision for inflation or attorney's fees. Thus, it is argued
that pain and suffering damages are proper because they make up
for these uncompensated losses.85
This defense of pain and suffering damages evokes a myriad of
responses. It is unsound even without considering the new medical
evidence. First, implicit in the suggestion that recoveries for pain
properly indemnify economic losses lies the admission that they are
not intended to compensate for noneconomic losses. Second, the suggestion that pain and suffering damages may properly be used to pay
attorney's fees is disingenuous. The American judicial system has
established that, except in specific instances,86 successful parties may
84. J. O'CONNELL&: R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 26-27.
85. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337,
15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) (pain and suffering awards pay for attorney's fees not otherwise compensated).
86. For example, successful plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees in antitrust
actions, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act cases, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1970); Merchant Marine Act cases, 46 U.S.C. § 1228 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act
cases, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); and Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act cases,
7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970), among others. The grant of attorney's fees to a prevailing
party is left to the discretion of the court in copyright cases, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970);
patent infringement suits, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); and cases arising under the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970). Also, attorney's fees are commonly recoverable as costs in a
variety of state actions, including those for libel, slander, and the enforcement of
mechanics' liens. See generally Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. Coto. L. REv. 202 (1966); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 911 (1949).
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not recover litigation costs. There may be cogent arguments against
the general rule, but if injured plaintiffs deserve to recover attorney's fees, the fees should be awarded to them on that basis, so
that they receive neither more nor less than full compensation for
those expenses.
Pain and suffering damages reveal their most serious lack of
justification if one considers the overriding objective of tort law to
be a proper allocation of risks and resources. Misallocations occur for
two reasons: Transactional costs produce irrational distributions,
and costs are not allocated on a justifiable basis. Awarding compensation for pain and suffering almost certainly produces economic
distortions because it gives weight to a factor-pain-that has no
definite economic measure. The distortions grow because pain is
highly variable and the procedures for fixing its economic weight in
given cases-for example, jury trials-are so expensive that there is a
great incentive to avoid using them.
Focusing on accurate cost accounting, the question arises whether
the cost of pain-and especially the cost of psychogenic pain-is
more appropriately allocated to one of life's activities that may have
a more significant causal relation to the pain than the defendant's
tortious conduct.87 The import of the new medical evidence on the
accuracy of cost accounting is discussed below, in the context of
investigating legislative attempts to allocate damages to one or
another precipitating activity.88 However, some variations of the
allocation argument should be dealt with first.
Professors Blum and Kalven have challenged the efficacy of any
attempted reallocation by suggesting that critics of compensation for
pain and suffering have mistakenly considered it as a specific item of
damage added by a judge or a jury to medical expenses and economic
losses.89 They suggest that if pain and suffering recoveries were
87. The concern for maintaining accurate cost accounting is not as great under
the negligence principle as it might be under other principles of liability. The
negligence principle assumes the reallocation of accident costs will occur only when
these costs are caused by a failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent
person and are not the normal incidents of an activity. Moreover, even if we were
to pursue a policy of proper allocation of resources and could prove that such a
system required satisfaction of economic losses from accidents, we could not be
certain that such a result would be ensured by eliminating pain and suffering damages,
Nevertheless, there is a concern about the justice done by a system that, as will be
seen, leaves demonstrable economic losses uncompensated while a substantial amount
of the available economic resources are paid for an elusive item having no readily
ascertainable market value.
88. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
89. W. BLUM &: H. KAI.VEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM
35 (1965).
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disallowed damage awards might remain as high as they are now,
because juries search for a sum that corresponds ·with the dignitary
aspects of injuries and do not add compensation for pain to what
would othenvise be an appropriate award.90 Thus, an attempt to reallocate resources by eliminating damages for pain would fail, as
juries would simply increase the award in other categories.
Ali Professor Kalven himself has noted,91 however, the popular
supposition is that juries are responsive to claims for compensation
for pain. And even if Blum and Kalven are correct about jury behavior, lawyers assume that pain and suffering claims are of significance to the jury, and they almost certainly act in accord with those
assumptions when they negotiate settlements. Moreover, it is unlikely that a jury would deal with the dignitary aspects of an injury if
it had not first compensated for economic loss. It is not sensible to
do something of doubtful efficacy while leaving undone something
that would more certainly further a desired objective. Juries may be
trusted to see that compensation of demonstrated economic losses
more certainly returns the injured victim to his position before the
accident than does the payment of damages for pain.
While increased damages for pain and suffering have achieved
greatest publicity in the few cases in which enormous amounts have
been awarded,92 they have had their major effect upon the pattern of
compensation awards in the much more numerous cases in which
smaller amounts have been recovered. The result has been an egregious misallocation of resources in that the substantial economic losses
of some parties remain unsatisfied while other parties recover
amounts vastly in excess of their relatively small economic losses.93
90. If so, juries are acting in a manner consistent with Professor Jaffe's suggestion
that damages for pain and suffering function as a solatium for the victim. See text
accompanying note 76 supra.
91. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo
ST. L.J. 158, 170 (1958).
92. See C. GREGORY &: H. KAI.VEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 546-47 (2d ed.
1969).
93. A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation indicates that
while persons with economic losses of $1,000 or less received 46% of all tort payment
dollars, those persons incurred only 33% of the economic losses. Ninety-three per cent
of the payment dollars went to persons with economic losses of $10,000 or less,. while
they suffered only 84% of the economic losses. U.S. DEFT. OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1971)
[hereinafter CRASH LoSSEs]. See also Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and
the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev.
l (1961). The misallocation of resources seems even greater in cases involving death
or serious injuries. The tort system provided a recovery of 4.5 times economic losses
for persons suffering losses of less than $500, whereas victims who had suffered
economic losses of $25,000 or more recovered only 30% of their losses. CRASH LoSSEs,
supra, at 36. Serious injury was defined to be an injury that resulted in medical
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The explanation for this misallocation of funds to pain and suffering
rather than economic losses lies in the dynamics of the out-of-court
settlements that govern almost all liability cases.04
Limits on liability under insurance policies are undoubtedly a
very significant factor in producing the incomplete compensation of
the largest economic claims. Of greater importance in determining
where the available resources go is the fact that from the defense
side it may be wise to settle a case without the expense of careful
investigation and evaluation. Particularly, it makes sense from a business viewpoint for insurance companies to buy up small claimsthose that involve little or no economic loss-at a relatively low
price, thus avoiding the possibility of large judgments for pain and
suffering. Consequently, out of the 44 cents of the liability insurance
premium dollar that finally reaches automobile accident victims,
21.5 cents is used to pay general damages, such as pain and suffering,
leaving only 22.5 cents for compensation of economic losses. 0u
One may protest, however, that in the dynamics of negotiation
the threat of substantial damages for pain and suffering is necessary
to force compensation for economic losses. But, as indicated above,
the threat has not worked for those who suffer the most serious harm
and it appears to have worked too well for those who do not have
substantial economic losses. In any event, the integrity of the law is
not served by permitting recovery for the alleged purpose of changing
the balance of power in negotiations. It would be far more direct and
efficacious to change the balance of bargaining power by allowing
recovery of attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, or interest on sums
ultimately found due.
B. Legislative Allocation: Automobile Accident
Reparation Plans

Drastic proposals for revision of the tort law system have been
made in the various no-fault plans that have been proposed and even
adopted in a number of states.06 Probably the most controversial
costs (excluding hospital costs) of $500 or more, or two weeks or more of hospitalization, or, if working, three weeks or more of missed work, or, if not working, six
weeks or more of missed normal activity. 1 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, EcONOIIIIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 17 (1970). Persons who suffered only
7% of the economic losses in death or serious accident cases received 27% of the
net tort payments. CRASH LoSSES, supra, at 40.
94. See CRASH LoSSEs, supra note 93, at 37.
95. Id. at 51-52. Of the 22.5 cents used to compensate for economic losses, 8 cents
is duplicative of payments from other sources, leaving only 14.5 cents for otherwise
uncompensated economic losses. Id,
96. Several states have enacted automobile accident reparation laws that bar
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aspect of no-fault automobile accident reparation plans has been
the elimination or drastic limitation of compensation for pain and
suffering. Hence, the new medical views of pain are of great significance for an appraisal of the provisions found in the automobile accident reparation plans. It is in legislatures, rather than courts, that
general principles may properly be framed for the majority of cases.
The pertinent provision of the proposed Hart-Magnuson National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act currently reads as follows:
A person remains liable for damages for noneconomic detriment
in excess of $2,500, if the accident results in
(A) death, serious and permanent disfigurement, or other serious
and permanent injury; or
(B) more than ninety continuous days of total disability. As used
in this subparagraph, "total disability" means medically determinable physical or mental impairment which prevents
the victim from performing all or substantially all of the
material acts and duties which constitute his usual and customary daily activities.97

The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act proposed
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws contains a comparable
limitation on tort liability:
Tort liability ·with respect to accidents occurring in this State and
arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
is abolished except as to:
(7) damages in excess of [$5,000] for non-economic detriment, but
only if the accident causes death, significant permanent injury, serious permanent disfigurement, or more than 6 months of complete
inability of the injured person to work in an occupation. "Complete
inability of an injured person to work in an occupation" means inability to perform, on even a part-time basis, even some of the
duties required by his occupation or, if unemployed at the time of
recovery of damages for pain and suffering in cases not involving impairment of
bodily function or serious permanent disfigurement, unless the medical and hospital
bills necessary for treatment of the injury exceed a fixed dollar figure. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323(a)(7) (Supp. 1973) (.$400); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2)
(Supp. 1973) ($1,000); KAN. STAT• .ANN. § 40-3117(b) (1973) ($500); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1973) (.$500); N.Y. !Ns. LAw §§ 671(4)(b), 673(1) (McKinney Supp.
1973-74) ($500).
Part of the Florida provision establishing a threshold for recovery of pain and
suffering damages was recently ruled unconstitutional by the Florida supreme court.
See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 42,856 (April 17, 1974).
§

97. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
206(a)(5) (1974) (passed in the Senate on May 1, 1974, 120 CONG. R.Ec. 60).
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the injury, any occupation for which the injured person was qualified. 98
The Michigan no-fault motor vehicle insurance act permits recovery under tort law for noneconomic loss " ... only if the injured
party has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or
permanent serious disfigurement." 99
The reluctance to allow recovery for pain and suffering expressed
in these proposals is not a response to the new medical evidence discussed here. In part the exclusion of compensation for pain reflects
the understanding that such claims are weaker under a no-fault
system because the victim's recovery is no longer grounded on the
presence of a culpable defendant.100 Also, to some extent the reluctance to allow such compensation is motivated by a concern for the
fiscal viability of the no-fault system and the difficulty and expense
of assessing the proper amount of compensation for pain and suffering.101 The world is not perfect, and the difficulties created by small
claims for pain and suffering provide a justification for settling for
less than an exquisite perfection in compensating such claims. Pain
endured over a long period of time is obviously a matter of greater
concern. Here the new medical views of pain may make a valuable
contribution in formulating plans.
Although the medical data do not permit precise statement of
what proportion of chronic pain has no organic or physiological
basis, the proportion is apparently quite substantial.102 Operant
mechanisms are among the most common causes of chronic pain.103
Knowledge that chronic pain is likely to be psychogenic or preserved
by operant mechanisms may reduce the sympathy or concern that
98. UNIFORM MOTOR VEmCLE ACCIDENT REPARATION ACT § 5(a}(7). "Non-economic
detriment" is defined in section l(a)(9} of the Act to mean ", •• pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, and other nonpecuniary damage recoverable
under the tort law of the State. The term does not include punitive or exemplary
damages."
99. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 500.3135 (Supp. 1973).
100. See Jaffe, supra note 1, at 235; James, supra note 70, at 297. This consideration has provided a major argument for elimination of pain and suffering compensation from no-fault automobile accident reparation plans. See, e.g., R. KEETON &:
J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 359-61 (1965). See also
L GREEN, supra note 69, at 88.
101. That determination of the amount of compensation that should be given
for pain and suffering is a substantial obstacle to settlement of claims under the
existing tort system is clearly indicated by the Michigan automobile injury survey.
Sixty-six per cent of both claimants and defense lawyers designated it as a cause of
disagreement causing a trial and seventeen per cent of both groups of lawyers designated it as the first ranking factor. ACCIDENT Cosrs, supra note 82, at 214-15,
102. See note 64 supra and text accompanying notes 57-64 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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some persons would otherwise feel for the accident victim. More
important, it indicates that compensation for pain cannot with
confidence be assessed as a cost properly allocated to the activity of
driving automobiles,1°4 and that it may therefore properly be eliminated from a no-fault plan.
If chronic pain usually is suffered only by certain persons and if
it is caused or preserved by operant mechanisms that function only
because of interpersonal problems in family, work, or other social
relationships, it is a cost more properly allocated to the activities or
forces causing the stress in the victim's life than to automobile
transportation. Indeed, if the pain is caused or preserved by operant
mechanisms-if it is in fact "needed" or "desired"-it is likely that
some other ·event would soon have triggered a career of suffering.
There may be a cause-in-fact relationship between the automobile
accident and the initial pain, but it is not an adequate basis for requiring users of automobiles to provide compensation for the victim's
ongoing experience of self-serving psychogenic pain.
The latest medical conceptions of pain thus support the limitations on pain and suffering claims found in most automobile accident
reparation plans. However, the plans do not bar such claims completely. The extent to which the provisions will prevent recovery for
psychogenic pain depends upon whether words such as "permanent
injury" and "serious impairment of body function" are construed
to require a substantial and identifiable organic or physiological base
for the injury or impairment. Recoveries for psychogenic pain ·will
probably be allowed where the pain has impaired body function or
disabled one from working.105 To the extent that psychogenic pain
is not properly allocable to the activity of operating automobiles
these recoveries will improperly charge automobilists. Recoveries
for psychogenic pain may also be allowed in cases of disfigurement or
loss of a limb. Despite the mutilation, if tissue destruction or irritation has ceased, the peripheral nerves no longer receive the stimulation that causes them to send impulses to the central nervous system,100 and continued pain is probably psychogenic or produced by
operant mechanisms.107 Perhaps the physical trauma required to
produce these injuries, however, makes even psychogenic pain a cost
properly allocable to the operation of automobiles.
104. W. BLUM & H. K.ALVEN, supra note 89, at 57-61; G. CALABRESI, supra note 66,
d13~9~
'
105. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
106. See authorities cited in note 6 supra. See also Bonica, supra note 51, at 82.
107. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 131-32.
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It should be noted that compensation for nonpsychogenic pain
does not result in a misallocation of costs (assuming the costs can be
measured). Numerous factors other than the use of an automobilesome social and some personal-must converge after an accident to
produce psychogenic pain. For pain that does have a physiological
basis, however, no such convergence of forces is necessary, and use of
the automobile remains the dominant factor in the loss suffered. In
this respect, schemes such as the Michigan act,108 which at least
requires an initial physiological basis for compensable pain by conditioning the maintenance of tort actions on death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement, may be
preferred over flat dollar limitations, such as the exclusion of the first
5,000 dollars of pain and suffering damages under the Basic Protection Act proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell.100
Even the Michigan act, however, may reflect no more than a
judgment that persons suffering severe injuries deserve some compensation for pain, and, since it is beyond available economic resources
to fully compensate such persons without regard to fault, some tort
actions are preserved. This judgment has the appeal of traditional
tort law, but if no-fault schemes as a whole are designed to make
automobile transportation bear only the costs that are properly
allocable to it, it should be recognized that psychogenic pain is not
such a cost. Accordingly, the provisions in no-fault plans preserving
tort recoveries in certain cases should be revised to preclude recoveries for psychogenic pain.110
The new medical evidence proves useful even where tort claims
are preserved. Knowledge that physiologically-based pain may be
maintained or magnified by operant mechanisms suggests that there
should be no dollar thresholds on the amount of pain that must be
suffered to make compensation possible. The reinforcement power
of money is obvious, and an injured person may well heighten his
suffering to qualify for an award.111
108. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
109. PROPOSED MOTOR VEHICLE BASIC PROTECTION INSURANCE Aar § 4.2(1), in R.
KEETON &: J. O'CONNELL, supra note 100, at 323.
110. For example, the words "physical injury" could be substituted for the word
"injury" in provisions saving tort actions, and "physical injury" could be defined to
mean an injury for which there is an identifiable organic or physiological base.
111. A survey made by O'Connell and Simon suggests that this should not be a
matter of great concern. It indicates that only 28 per cent of the persons injured in
automobile accidents expected at the time of the accidents that they would be
paid for pain and suffering, and only 34 per cent of those who did not initially
know about payments made for pain and suffering ever leaned about them. J.
O'CONNELL &: R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 19-20. Consulting a lawyer did not significantly increase awareness of the possibility of obtaining damages for pain; only
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The converse of this argument is also important. Adoption of a
no-fault accident reparation plan that permits no recovery for pain
might actually reduce the pain experienced by accident victims,
because it would make certain the recovery of economic losses and
reduce the uncertainties and anxieties that beset an accident victim
under the tort system. As mentioned above,11 2 there is little doubt
that anxiety increases the intensity of pain. True, such anxiety is
usually about the injury, and is distinguishable from anxiety about
whether one will be compensated. But the anxieties created by feeling sensation from and viewing a bandaged limb and the anxieties
about whether the limb will operate well enough to permit one to
earn a living certainly overlap. If the security that came to soldiers
on Anzio beachhead from knowing that they would be removed from
the battle zone could reduce their pain,113 it is not implausible that
the security of knowing that economic losses will be reimbursed may
reduce the pain of one who contemplates his economic future.
Even if compensation is limited to economic loss, the form of
compensation should be considered in light of the new medical
evidence. A common feature of automobile reparation plans is reimbursement of lost earnings on an installment basis for a stated period
of time.114 The danger that claimants might malinger in order to
stretch their eligibility to the maximum is obvious. The same concern exists regarding the provision of the Uniform Act preserving
36 per cent of those who initially did not know about payments for pain and suffering and who later consulted a lawyer learned about them, id. at 25, and most of
those questioned who knew that damages could be awarded for pain and suffering
said that the possibility of payment had no effect on their pain. Id. at 26. The
reliability of this last finding, however, diminishes when one considers how unlikely
it is that a victim would ever admit or know that the possibility of a larger recovery
had affected his pain. Moreover, the O'Connell and Simon survey involved cases in
which the median award in litigated cases was only $2004, and the median for all
cases surveyed only $487. Id. at 16. The survey, therefore, probably does not reflect
the extent to which claimants become aware of payments for pain and suffering
in more serious cases or the effect of that knowledge on their pain. In cases involving
large claims many lawyers probably would inform their clients that their pain is
an element of damages. In any case, proper preparation by a lawyer of a large
claim would involve a detailed investigation of the pain experienced by the client
and hence alert all but the most obtuse to the fact that pain is an important part
of the claim. That knowledge of payment for pain and suffering affects conduct is
indicated by the fact that only 24 per cent of all survey respondents consulted a
lawyer, whereas 40 per cent of those who initially knew about payment for pain
and suffering did so. Id. at 20.
112. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
114. See, e.g., National No-Fanlt Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, S. 354, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 106A (1973); UNIFORM: MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATION Ac::r § 23
(1972); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 500.3142 (Supp. 1973); PROPOSED MOTOR VEHICLE
PROTECl'ION INSURANCE Ac::r, in R. KEETON &: J. O'CONNELL, supra note 100, at 318.
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tort claims in cases involving a six month inability to work.11u There
must now be added concern that operant mechanisms and cognitive
dissonance116 will create or preserve physically disabling pain. Perhaps lump sum payments, which are permitted, for example, under
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act,117 would be
preferable to installment payments. In any case, information comparing the activities of persons receiving lump sum payments and those
compensated on an installment basis is needed.
C. Practical Implications of the New Views Under

Present Tort Law
I. Psychiatric or Psychological Examination of a Plaintiff
Absent legislation barring recovery for pain, the new medical
evidence may have an effect upon the law developed and applied by
judges and juries.118 If the effect is to be that of limiting compensation, more will be required than a showing of a generalized possibility that pain sensations are psychogenic. A defendant will have to
prove through testimony of ex.pert witnesses that the pain suffered by
a particular plaintiff is psychogenic.
It may be difficult, however, to find doctors who are sufficiently
familiar with the new medical views of pain to make an assessment of
whether a claimant's pain is psychogenic. There are no statistics on
such a question, but it is likely that most practicing physicians adhere
to the older, specific pain receptor theory of how pain is reported to
the brain. Furthermore, the average busy physician is understandably
115. UNIFORM MOTOR VEIDCLE ACCIDENT REPARATION ACT § 5(a)(6} (1972),
116. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
117. Section 26 of the Act permits lump sum settlement, not exceeding $2500,
without court intervention. Settlements exceeding that amount require court approval.
118. Professor Morris suggests that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to undertake comprehensive revision of the law regarding pain and suffering. Morris, supra
note 1, at 47'7. He argues that legislatures have better facilities for investigation and
formulation of law than courts, that the law should not be changed retroactively to
reduce the claim of a victim awaiting the proper time for settlement, and that
courts should not risk public censure by undertaking what would be recognizable as
a lawmaking function. Id. at 482-83. However, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, see
Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN.
L. R.Ev. 265 (1963), legislatures seldom if ever use their information-gathering powers
for the purpose of proposing or formulating legislation; courts may, if it is deemed
desirable, utilize the technique of prospective overruling, and the judiciary rightfully
plays an active role in the reform of tort law. Cf. R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do
JurnCE (1969). The judiciary should utilize a case-by-case development in order to
produce what might be considered the experimental data from which it may more
confidently formulate a complete statement of the rules applicable to psychogenic
pain. Cf. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 271-72
(1968).
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not likely to have made a personality survey of his patient or to have
investigated the interpersonal stresses to which his patient has been
subjected at home or at work. A neurologist, psychiatrist, or psychologist hired by the defendant would be the more likely source of such
expert testimony. However, the expert's examination of the plaintiff
may prove procedurally complicated.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes express
provision for a physical or mental examination by a physician when
the physical or mental condition of a party is in controversy.119 Comparable provisions are found in the procedural rules of a number of
states.120 Psychiatric examinations have been ordered under these
rules, but there is very little case law to assist one in determining
whether they provide a basis for an examination to determine
whether a planitiff's pain is psychogenic.121 By the language of rule
35 such an examination cannot be ordered unless the plaintiff's
"mental or physical condition" is "in controversy" under the prevailing substantive rules of tort law. The nature of the plaintiff's pain
in this instance would relate to his physical and mental condition
both; and, since the amount of compensation would depend on the
examination, his condition should be considered "in controversy."
Assuming that examinations may be ordered under rule 35, or
119. (a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination
by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal
control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person
or persons by whom it is to be made.
FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
120. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2231, at 665-66
(1969). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2032 (West Supp. 1973); 13A DEL. CODE ANN.
160-61 (Rule 35, Superior Court), 248-49 (Rule 35, Chancery Court); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. HOA, § 215 (1973).
121. A decision of a New Jersey county court held that it was proper for a deputy
of the Workmen's Compensation Division to order sua sponte that a claimant be
examined by an independent neuropsychiatrist. It was also held that the neuropsychiatrist's testimony that the claimant suffered from a neurosis supported an
increase in disability payments. Polulich v. J.G. Schmidt Tool Die & Stamping Co.,
46 N.J. Super. 135, 134 A-2d 29 (1957). On the other hand, a federal district court
refused to order a mental examination of a plaintiff in an action for invasion of
privacy in which the plaintiff alleged emotional distress, mental anguish, and injury
to personal health, welfare, and well-being, because it was not satisfied that the
mental condition of the plaintiff had been placed in controversy. The court stated
that it would entertain a motion for a mental examination after hearing the opinion
of the physician who conducted the physical examination. Stuart v. Burford, 264 F.
Supp. 191 (N.D. Okla. 1967). In any case, precedent has limited value in this area.
Medicine is constantly advancing, and each case is different. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 120, at 684.
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a comparable state rule, a question may arise as to whether they may
be made by psychologists or whether only those holding a medical
degree will be considered "physicians" within the meaning of the
rule. The question may be significant because an important diagnostic tool used in the operant treatment of pain122 is the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, an elaborate personality test
consisting of over 550 written, true-false questions. The answers give
an outline of the subject's personality from which generalizations
may be made about his attitude toward life and his susceptibility to
operant mechanisms for production of pain.128 Although its value is
recognized by the medical profession,124 the test is more frequently
used by psychologists than psychiatrists. Indeed, operant treatment
of chronic pain has its foundations in the teachings of psychologist
B. F. Skinner, rather than in traditional medical or psychiatric
methods. The qualification of psychologists to conduct an examination under rule 35 is therefore an important but unresolved question. As a compromise solution, a psychiatrist might have a psychologist administer the test as part of the psychiatrist's total examination of the party.

2.

The Per Diem Argument

New styles of advocacy have undoubtedly contributed to the
dramatic increase in damages awarded for pain and suffering. One
recently developed tactic to which the new medical views have application is the per diem argument. The per diem argument, which
stresses a unit of time system for determining the amount of damages
that should be given for pain and suffering, is a favored-and controversial-tool of claimants' attorneys. Melvin Belli first described
the technique as follows:
You must break up the 30-year life expectancy into finite detailed
periods of time. You must take these small periods of time, seconds
and minutes, and determine in dollars and cents what each period
is worth. You must start with the seconds and minutes rather than
at the other end of thirty years. You cannot stand in front of a jury
and say, "Here is a man horribly injured, permanently disabled, who
122. Operant treatment makes use of operant conditioning. See note 51 supra,
123. See generally w. CoITLE, THE MMPI: A REvmw (1953); w. SWENSON, AN
MMPI SOURCE BOOK (1973).
124. See Bonica, supra note 51, at 83 (test is frequently applied at the Pain Clinic
of the University of Washington School of Medicine).
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will suffer excruciating pain for the rest of his life, he is entitled to
a verdict of $225,000."125
Using the case of a man with an irreparably injured back and a
thirty-year life expectancy, Belli illustrated a possible closing argument to the jury:
You are asked to evaluate in dollars and cents what pain and suffering is. This honorable court ·will instruct you that a man of this age
has a life expectancy of thirty years. Let's put it to you bluntly, what's
pain and suffering worth? You've got to answer this question. You've
got to award for this as well as the special damages and loss of wages.
Let's take Pat, my client, down to the waterfront. He sees Mike, an
old friend. He goes up to him and says, "Mike, I've got a job for you.
It's a perfect job. You're not going to have to work any more for the
rest of your life.... You don't have to work even one second. All
you have to do is to trade me your good back for my bad one and
I'll give you five dollars a day for the rest of your life. Do you know
what five dollars a day for the rest of your life is? Why that's $60,0001
Of course, I realize that you are not going to be able to do any walking, or any swimming, or driving an automobile, or be able to sit in
a moving picture show; you're going to have excruciating pain and
suffering with this job, thirty-one million seconds a year, and once
you take it on, you'll never be able to relieve yourself of this, but you
get $60,0001" Do you think that Mike would take on that job for
$60,0001 126
The obvious appeal of such an argument before a jury makes it
understandable that defense counsel have labored hard to prevent its
use. The major arguments against the propriety of the per diem
tactic have been concerned ·with whether it has a foundation in
evidence, whether counsel should be permitted to substitute their
statements for evidence, whether counsel making such an argument
invade the province of the jury, and whether a mathematical formula
creates an illusion of certainty.127 By now the issue has been settled
in most jurisdictions, with a majority allowing the use of the per
diem argument.128
125. M. BELLI, THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE IN ACHIEVING "THE MORE
ADEQUATE AwAIID" 33-34 (1952) [hereinafter DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE]. See also 1
M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 870-72 (1954).
126. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, supra note 125, at 34.
127. An excellent summary of the cases and law review literature dealing with the
problem may be found in 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, at 141-45 (Supp.
1968). See also Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966);
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966).
128. The Supreme Court of California concluded that as of 1966 twenty-one
jurisdictions permitted the argument and eleven did not. Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d
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The new medical evidence concerning variations in pain tolerances and thresholds129 suggests the impropriety of setting a price for
pain on a per unit basis. The experience of and reaction to pain may
vary widely from plaintiff to plaintiff and juror to juror, and an
argument such as the per diem argument, which gives a value to
pain that is supposedly valid for all persons, is highly questionable.
Of even greater concern is the discovery that Mr. Belli's client
with the irreparably injured back may well be a "low back loser" who
has "applied for the job" of suffering because of the secondary gains
that his painful career brings him.180 There is an obvious danger
in asking jurors who have no desire for such a "job" to assess damages
on the basis of the pay they personally would find appropriate.
These new arguments are probably not sufficient to reopen debate
over the per diem argument in jurisdictions in which the issue is
settled, but they most certainly may be used in those jurisdictions in
which the permissibility of the per diem argument rests in the discretion of the trial court.131
3. Psychogenic Pain and Traditional Tort Concepts

a. Taking a victim as the tortfeasor finds him. The new medical
evidence may have only a limited effect on tort law if it is considered
simply a better explanation of why an accident victim experiences
pain. The impact of the evidence depends on how it is related to exculpation of the wrongdoer under familiar tort law concepts. The
remainder of this article suggests that such concepts provide an opportunity for the use of the evidence to limit compensation for pain.
At first glance the well-established principle that the tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him seems to contradict this conclusion.
The principle requires that the wrongdoer bear the consequences of
his tortious act regardless of any condition that made the plaintiff
166, 173-74, 417 P.2d 673, 676-77, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 182-33 (1966). See, e.g., Baron Tube
Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 S.2d

82 (Fla. App. 1959); Southern Ind. Gas &: Elec. Co. v. Bone, 135 Ind. App. 531, 180
N.E.2d 375 (1962), dissenting opinion reported separately at 244 Ind. 672, 195 N,E.2d
488 (1964); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961} (allowing per diem
argument); Henne v. Balick, 1 Storey 369, 146 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958); Caley v. Manicke,
24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.W.2d 206 (1962); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959)
(rejecting per diem argument).
129. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. See also note 64 supra.
131. See Ratner v. Arrington, 111 S.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Wyant v. Dunn, 140
Mont. 181, 360 P.2d 917 (1962); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d
23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960).
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susceptible to greater harm than the ordinary person would have
suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct.182 It applies not only
to intentionally inflicted injuries, where it fits most appropriately,
but to negligently inflicted injuries as well.133
Although usually invoked where the plaintiff's damages were
exacerbated by a preexisting physical weakness, courts have applied
the principle in cases in which excess pain and suffering were due
to the plaintiff's neurotic condition.134 In Thomas v. United States,135
the leading decision to this effect, the plaintiff was injured when a
government mail truck collided with the automobile in which she
was riding. Three years before the accident the plaintiff had been
hospitalized and treated for six months for a psychoneurotic depressive reaction, and the injuries she received were a substantial factor
in arousing this dormant condition. She suffered pain for more than
two years, wore a neck brace for more than six months, was hospitalized three times, and was unable to return to work for two years.
The court of appeals reversed for lack of supporting evidence a
trial court finding that the plaintiff had suffered "gratification"136
from her pain and suffering. However, the court noted evidence that
the plaintiff was "ripe"187 for the reaction she experienced and concluded that the superimposition of physical injuries on her mental
problem increased her anxieties until she could no longer control
them.138 As a result she underwent a more extreme reaction than
would normally follow. Nevertheless, the court held that the secondary effect of the injuries upon the plaintiff did not lessen the
obligation of the government to pay for her pain and suffering. In
rejecting the government's argument that pain resulting from a
plaintiff's psychological makeup is not compensable, the court said:
132. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Russell v.
City of Wildwood, 428 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1970); Sweet Milk Co. v. Standfield,
353 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1965); Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 504 (5th
Cir. 1964); Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 347 (2d Cir. 1963); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1945); Pieczonka
v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Poplar v. Bourjois, 298
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
133. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR.TS § 461, comment b (1965); 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 20.3, at 1127-28.
134. Bourne v. Washburn, 441 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Steinhauser v. Hertz
Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Parrish v. United States, 357 F.2d 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964).
135. 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964).
136. 327 F.2d at 380.
137. 327 F.2d at 381.
138. 327 F.2d at 381.
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"Until the sciences of law, psychiatry and psychology co-develop to a
stage at which there is a fuller understanding of human pain and
suffering, we think it unwise to formulate a rule of damages which
reduces the compensation for an injured plaintiff to a 'net,' after
crediting the tortfeasor with a secondary effect of the injury due
plaintiff's psychic weakness, aroused by the injury."130 The Courts of
Appeals for the District of Columbia140 and the Second Circuit141
have similarly held that damages may be recovered for pain suffered
because injuries received in an accident cause a recurrence or aggravation of a preexisting psychic weakness.
It is not surprising that courts have so held. It has become conventional to discuss mental disorders in terms of mental "illness,"
a construct that carries with it a strong suggestion of a physiological
base.142 Uncritical acceptance of such a view, or unwillingness to be
persuaded by a psychiatric analysis disclosing a nonorganic base, leads
to treatment of preexisting psychic weakness as though it were a thin
skull, a weak back, or hemophilia-the classic hornbook illustrations
of the principle requiring a tortfeasor to take his victim as he finds
him.143 However, as noted above,144 not all persons suffering from
psychogenic pain have personality disorders, and it is quite unnecessary to postulate some form of emotional disturbance for the existence of operant pain. It is therefore inaccurate to characterize such
pain as a product of a preexisting physical or mental condition of the
person injured. The pain is experienced because family, work, or
other social factors lead the victim subsequently to adopt a life of
chronic pain. While the tortfeasor may have to take his victim as he
finds him, it is a different matter to require the tortfeasor to take
his victim as the victim's family, friends, or co-workers relate to him
and as he subsequently responds to those relationships.
Moreover, the rationale for the principle that the tortfeasor must
take his victim as he finds him is by no means clear. The doctrine
originated when the principal mode of tort recovery was an action
for trespass, in which no distinction was drawn benveen foreseen and
139.
140.
141.
142.

327 F.2d at 381 (footnote omitted).
Bourne v. Washburn, 441 F.2d 1022 (1971).
Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (1970).
For a vigorous criticism of this view, see T. SZASZ, THE MITH OF MENTAL
!Lr.NESS (1961).
143. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 261·62 (4th
ed. 1971).
144. See text following note 32 supra.
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unforeseen consequences.145 Once established, the principle may have
been carried to negligence actions for reasons other than those that
led to its adoption. Certainly it has served the judiciary well by
sparing it the difficult tasks of deciding how severe an injury "should"
have become, how much pain "should" have been suffered, or how
much income "should" have been lost.
The new medical understanding, however, makes it administratively feasible to distinguish between psychogenic pain and pain that
has a physiological base, particularly if the burden of proof is on the
defendant. Indeed, defense counsel might even be able to establish
what pain is suffered because of a preexisting psychic disorder. Thus,
that portion of the plaintiff's pain properly allocable to the defendant's actions may be isolated, and recovery limited accordingly.
Viewed in terms of how well compensation for psychogenic pain
serves the interests of society, the principle requiring the tortfeasor
to take his victim as he finds him should not inexorably require
compensation for psychogenic pain.
b. Avoidable consequences. Another familiar principle of tort
law is that a victim is not entitled to recover for harm he could have
avoided by making reasonable efforts or expenditures after the tortious injury.146 The principle bears a close relationship to the contributory negligence doctrine; factors considered in determining
whether a person made reasonable efforts to avoid harmful consequences are generally the same as those considered in determining
whether conduct is negligent.147 However, contributory negligence
must be a cause in fact of the accident or injury to bar recovery. By
contrast, conduct to which the avoidable consequences principle is
applicable simply affects the amount of resultant harm. A typical
case is that of an injured person's failure to obtain medical treatment
that would have reduced the seriousness of his injuries.148 The roots
of the principle include a policy of discouraging waste and community notions that fair compensation need not extend to injuries
that are in a practical sense self-inflicted.149
While the principle usually applies when the plaintiff fails to
mitigate his harm after the tort, related cases include those in which
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 7, at 29.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
147. Id., comment c.
148. See, e.g., Updegraff v. City of Ottumwa, 210 Iowa 382, 226 N.W. 928 (1929).
149. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir.
1961); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 918, comment a (1939).
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the plaintiffs negligent conduct prior to the accident contributes to
the seriousness of his injuries, although not a legal cause of the
accident. In Mahoney v. Beatman,150 a classic case of this sort, the
defendant's automobile crossed the center line and grazed the left
front wheel of the plaintiff's automobile. Because of its speed, the
plaintiffs automobile went out of control and was demolished; only
slight damage had been done by the contact with the defendant's
automobile. A majority of the Connecticut supreme court concluded
that the plaintiff was entitled to full recovery, but its opinion has
never received the approval that the commentators have bestowed
upon Justice Maltbie's dissent.151 Justice Maltbie would have limited
the plaintiffs recovery to the damage done by the initial impact and
denied recovery for that part of the damages attributable to the
excessive speed of plaintiff's automobile.152
A comparable problem recently came before the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit,153 and Judge Friendly gave his approval to
Justice Maltbie's view. The mvner of a building sought to recover
for losses suffered when employees of a tenant negligently failed to
call the fire department after the outbreak of a fire. Because of building code violations of the mvner, however, the building was particularly susceptible to fire. Judge Friendly concluded that a jury could
consider the faulty construction of the building in awarding damages
to the owner, and he gave his approval to a jury verdict of 120,000
dollars, in lieu of the 820,000 dollars actually lost by the plaintiff, as
a just, although unscientific, apportionment.
What might be called the "seat belt" cases have recently presented
additional occasions for considering the principle of avoidable consequences and the related treatment of ,contributory negligence that
does not cause an accident but does aggravate the injuries suffered. A
number of courts have allowed juries to consider whether damages
should be reduced because the plaintiff's injuries in an automobile
accident would have been less if he had been wearing a seat belt;lll4
150. 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762 (1929).
151. See 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 22.10, at 122; w. PROSSER, sttpra
note 128, § 65, at 423-24; Gregory, Justice Maltbie's Dissent in Mahoney v. Beatman,
24 CoNN. B.J. 78 (1950).
152. HO Conn. at 206-07, 147 A. at 770-71.
153. East Hampton Dewitt Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 1234
(1973).
154. See North v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Uresky v. Fedora, 27
Conn. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234
N.E.2d 329 (1968).
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other courts have indicated that the failure to wear an available seat
belt may go to the jury on the question of contributory negligence.155
The applicability of the avoidable consequences doctrine to psychogenic pain turns in large part upon whether the adoption of a
career of pain after injury is something that reasonable efforts or
expenditures could have avoided. Since victims of psychogenic pain
are generally unconscious of the mechanisms that produce their pain,
it is difficult to charge them on a subjective standard with failure
to behave reasonably. Perhaps also their reactions following injury
should not be characterized as conduct because the reactions are
unconscious rather than understood and voluntary acts. However,
the law ordinarily determines reasonable conduct on the basis of an
object~ve standard.1156 Unless the actor is a child or a mental incompetent deficiencies and variations of temperament and emotional
balance are not taken into account.157 If an objective standard is used
to judge the response to accidental injury the conclusion might well
be reached that psychogenic pain is an "avoidable consequence." The
reactions that produce it certainly are not socially desirable, nor are
they reactions that all persons similarly situated would have had.
And, to the extent that the plaintiff contributed to his damages before the accident by surrounding himself with a social environment
that is conducive to pain, his pain was "avoidable." Community notions of fairness might well lead to a conclusion that compensation is
not required for such conduct.158
c. Inevitable consequences. If a defendant cannot invoke the
avoidable consequences principle, he may perhaps avoid liability by
155. See Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971); Turner v.
Pfluger, 407 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969); Tiemeyer v. Mdntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819 (Iowa
1970); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d
362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). However, a majority of courts still refuse to allow the
failure to wear a seatbelt to be considered contributory negligence. See Woods v.
Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Moore v. F~cher, 505 P .2d 383 (Colo. App.
1972); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967); Brown v. Kendrick,
192 S.2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1966); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 S.2d 784
(La. App. 1968); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969);
Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d
211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Derheim
v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972). See also Kavanagh v.
Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. Ct. 1966).
156. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, comment c (1964); REsrATEMENT OF
ToRTS § 918, comment c (1939).
157. Id. § 283(b), comment b.
158. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir.
1961).
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arguing the relevance of the rule of causation and damages applicable to inevitable consequences. According to this rule an actor is not
responsible for harm that another would have suffered even if the
actor had not injured him.159 In the leading case of Dillon v. Twin
State Gas & Electric Co.,160 a fourteen-year-old boy playing on a
girder of a bridge lost his balance and fell. He attempted to save
himself from the fall by grabbing an electrical wire that the defendant had negligently failed to insulate. The boy was electrocuted and
suit was brought by his estate. The New Hampshire court held that
if it could be shown that the boy would have fallen with serious
injury regardless of the defendant's negligence-that is, that some
injury was an inevitable consequence of the boy's situation without
regard to the defendant's acts-his loss of life or earning capacity
should be measured by its value in light of his inevitable injury.161
The inevitable consequences doctrine follows from the traditional view that conduct is not a cause in fact of harm that would
have occurred irrespective of the conduct. That view has been accepted in the Restatement of Torts, 162 subject to an exception that
permits, but does not require, a finding that the actor's negligent
conduct was a substantial cause of harm even though there was
another force equally capable of producing the harm. 163 It is consistent with the requirement that events occurring after tortious
injury but prior to trial be taken into consideration if they indicate
that the damages suffered were either greater or less than would have
been expected at the time of the accident.164 The principle has found
recognition in recent years in cases involving a preexisting physical
condition of a plaintiff that might have worsened even without the
tortious injury.165 More to the point, it has also been recognized in a
159. See W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 65, at 423-24.
160. 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. lll (1932).
161. 85 N.H. at 457, 163 A. at 115.
162. REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(1) (1934). See also w. PROSSER, supra note 143,
§ 52, at 321-22. This principle is consistent with the principle that events occurring
after tortious injury, but prior to trial, should be considered as relating to the
foreseeability of the amount of damages. See REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 910, comment b (1939); Seavey, The Effect on Tort Damages of Events Occurring Before Trial,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1237 (1953).
'
163. R.EsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(2) (1934).
164. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 910, comment b (1939); Seavey, supra note 162.
165. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 1964);
Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 347 (2d Cir. 1963); Kegel v. United
States, 289 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mont. 1968). Cf. Sweet Mille Co. v. Stanfield, 353 F.2d
811 (9th Cir. 1965). On the other hand, in workmen's compensation cases the effect
of the accident and a prior disease are not weighed in determining the loss of
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decision dealing with a tortfeasor's liability for psychic harm suffered
because the plaintiff's mental condition made her more susceptible
than the average person to such injury.166 Judge Friendly remarked:
Although the fact that [the plaintiff] has latent psychotic tendencies
would not defeat recovery if the accident was a precipitating cause of
schizophrenia, this may have a significant bearing on the amount of
damages. The defendants are entitled to explore the probability that
the child might have developed schizophrenia in any event. While
the evidence does not demonstrate that [the plaintiff] already had the
disease, it does suggest that she was a good prospect.... [l]f a defendant "succeeds in establishing that the plaintiff's pre-existing condition was bound to worsen * * an appropriate discount should be
made for the damages that would have been suffered even in the
absence of the defendant's negligence.167
The problem for the defendant in psychogenic pain cases, then, is
not so much law as it is proof. It must be shown that the plaintiff,
because of his psychic or social condition, was primed for pain: At
some time after the accident he would have utilized some other injury to produce the pain of which he complains. Such proof is obviously difficult, and the plaintiff is further protected by the rule
placing the burden of proof on the defendant.168 Again to quote
Judge Friendly, however: "It is no answer that exact prediction of
[the plaintiff's] future apart from the accident is difficult or even
impossible. However taxing such a problem may be for men who
devoted their lives to psychiatry, it is one for which a jury is ideally
suited." 169
d. Proximate cause. Many of the important policy decisions in
the law of torts are made under the heading of proximate cause. The
term itself, for which it would be better to substitute the phrase
"legal cause," 170 offers nothing to assist analysis of whether the relationship between the conduct of the defendant and the resultant
harm is such that the defendant should be held responsible. However
confused and obfuscating proximate cause language may be, the
earning capacity, nor is shortened life expectancy due to an existing disease considered. 1 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 12.20, at 3-263-65 (1972).
166, Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970).
167. 421 F.2d at 1173-74, quoting Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335,
347-48 (2d Cir. 1963).
168. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, at § 20.3.
169. 421 F.2d at 1174.
170. See REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934).
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principal function of the concept is to limit the scope of liability to
less than it would be if causation in fact were the only test.
Confidence in psychiatry and medicine has in recent years increased the scope of liability for tortious conduct.171 Perhaps it may
also lead to some limitations on liability. The strongest case for such
a limitation is one in which the plaintiff's preexisting idiosyncrasy is
so rare that he suffers injury as a result of psychic stimuli that are not
likely to injure an average person. Conduct that is a cause in fact of
the injury does not give rise to liability where there is neither
negligence nor legal cause.172 In most cases involving psychogenic
pain, however, there has been some physical injury and negligence
has been established. The question is whether liability should be cut
short of responsibility for all consequences, although recognized for
some of the consequences.
In his famous Palsgraf opinion,173 Justice-then Chief JudgeCardozo suggested the possibility that liability be limited to the
interests invaded by a negligent act: "There is room for argument
that a distinction is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests
invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an
insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an unforeseeable invasion of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security."174
The suggestion found approval in the Restatement of Torts, but
approval was later withdrawn for lack of case support.17° Nonetheless, the basic Palsgraf formula is an appealing resolution for disputes about the ambit of liability for harm-producing conduct: "The
171. From a rule requiring that there be at least some tortious impact upon
the person of the plaintiff, the law has moved to allow recovery where the bodily
harm results from shock or fright at harm or peril to an immediate family member
occurring in the plaintiff's presence. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (Tent.
Draft No. 19, 1973). See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 18.4, at 1031-34; W.
PROSSER, supra note 143, § 54, at 330-34. Earlier cases viewed suicide as an intervening cause and refused to impose liability when a seriously injured person, depressed
by his condition and future prospects, chose to end his life. E.g., Scheffer v. Railroad
Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881). See W. PROSSER, supra, § 44, at 280-81. More recently liability
has been imposed where expert testimony establishes that the suicide is the result
of an uncontrollable impulse that was in tum the result of the tortious injuries
suffered. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961); W.
PROSSER, supra, § 44, at 280-81.
172.
173.
174.
175.
08. See

Smith, supra note 62.
Palsgraf v. Long Island
248 N.Y. at 346-47, 162
REsrATEMENT OF TORTS
also W. PROSSER, supra

R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
N.E. at 101.
§ 281, comment j (1934). See id., app. § 281, at 307note 143, at _259-60.
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risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."176 The
formula suggests that an actor has a duty to refrain from conduct
that unreasonably threatens the physical safety of another, but does
not have a duty to protect the other from pain that is experienced
as a reaction to interpersonal relationships with family, fellow workers, or others.177
An analogous formulation has recently been offered by Professor
George Fletcher. He suggests that rights to recover for losses should
depend in part on an analysis of the reciprocity of risks imposed by
parties upon one another.178 Thus, "we all have the right to the
maximum amount of security compatible with a like security for
everyone else. This means that we are subject to harmJ without compensation) from background risks, but that no one may suffer harm
from additional risks without recourse for damages against the riskcreator."170 Psychogenic pain, or pain maintained by operant mechanisms, may be considered a "background" risk. In any case, it is so
individualized that surely it is nonreciprocal within Fletcher's
formulation. Thus, it does not deserve compensation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

These observations haye explored the possibility that new medical evidence will result in a limitation on damages awarded for pain.
However, so well entrenched is the right to recover for pain suffered
after physical injury that the new understanding of pain is unlikely
to produce significant change. Still, sooner or later we must acknowledge the questions the data raise about what the law of compensation
176. 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
177. An analogy may be found in the principle that imposes strict liability upon
one engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity. The absolute liability is restricted
to the types of risks that make the conduct abnormally dangerous. R.EsrATEMENT OF
ToRTs § 519, comment b (1938). Thus, persons engaging in blasting operations, who
would be liable for damages done by flying debris or concussion, have been held not
liable for the destruction of mink kittens by their frightened and agitated mothers.
Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P .2d 794 (1942); Foster v.
Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954). Of course, there is a wide
range for social decision-making in defining the risks that lead to characterization
of conduct as abnormally dangerous. Definition of the risks of blasting as not including the risk that mother minks will kill their young is a way of saying that it is
better that mink ranchers bear the risks of the excitable nature of minks than that
blasters compensate them for harm for which blasting operations were a cause in
fact. The decision will determine how much mink coats will cost as well as how
much it will cost to build on land that must be cleared by blasting.
178. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 537 (1972).
179. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
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is doing and what it should be doing to serve better the interests of
society. Tort law will be improved if lawyers and judges attack the
problem of compensating victims of pain with a better understanding
of the new medical evidence. Permitting recovery only for pain that
has a physiological basis would be a major step toward ensuring that
compensation furthers useful social values.

